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I N MILLIKEN V BRADLEY, I the Supreme Court reversed an af-
:firmative school desegregation order for the first time since the 
1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 2 By a five to four 
margin, the Court held that the district court was in error when it 
ordered fifty-three suburban school districts to participate in the 
desegregation of the predominantly black Detroit school district. 
The political implications of the decision were immediately appar-
ent. The Court had sentenced northern school desegregation to the 
death penalty before the baby had taken its first full breath.3 
Metropolitan-wide relief was the last hope for the meaningful inte-
gration of schools in a nation whose urban/suburban demography 
was becoming increasingly segregated.4 The Milliken decision not 
1. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This 1954 decision, hereinafter referred to as Brown, declared the 
fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional. A 
second Supreme Court decision, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). hereinafter referred to as Brown ll, set 
forth the principles and guidelines to be followed by lower courts in effectuating relief in 
desegregation cases. 
3. Statistics indicate that "in the North and South public schools today are more racially 
segregated than they were in 1954, and the barriers to desegregation, for all practical pur-
poses, are virtually insurmountable." SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EOUCATION OPPORTUN-
ITY, 920 CONG., 20 SESS., REPORT: TOWARD EQUAL EOUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 102-04 (Comm. 
Print 1972), 
4. See Taylor, Metropolitan- Wide Desegregation, 11 INEQUALITY IN Eouc. 45 (1972). Re-
cent statistics indicate that over two million black children attend schools in the nation's 20 
largest urban school districts. An average of 60% of the school populations in these districts 
are minority group students, and 90% of them attend schools that are predominantly non-
white. In the nation's five largest urban districts, the percentages of minority students are: 
15 
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only assured middle-class whites that their mass exodus to the sub-
urbs to seek refuge from blacks had not been made in vain,5 but the 
Supreme Court also made clear that they would not use school 
desegregation to invade the suburban fortress of housing for whites 
only.s 
The Milliken decision stands as a disturbing reflection of the 
changing political and social mood of the American public. In dis-
sent, Justice Marshall, who had argued Brown before the Supreme 
Court twenty years earlier, closed his opinion with a ringing indict-
ment of his colleagues in the majority: 
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived mood 
that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral prin-
ciples of law. In the short run, it may seem to be the easier 
course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up 
each into two cities-one white, the other black-but it is a 
course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret.7 
One is tempted to simply say "amen" to Justice Marshall's 
insightful analysis of the majority opinion as a myopic political 
accommodation to public mood. The immediate reaction of many 
critics of the Burger Court, including this author, ~as to write the 
opinion off as a not so facile rationalization of a politically expedient 
decision. But the opinion merits closer examination now that time 
New York, 66%; Los Angeles, 56%; Chicago, 71%; Philadelphia, 66%; and Detroit, 72%. In 
the next five largest districts (Houston, Baltimore, Dallas, Cleveland, and the District of 
Columbia), the minority school population averages 68%. Over 1.5 million minority children 
reside in these 10 districts. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND 
WELFARE, FALL 1972 AND FALL 1973 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL SURVEY PRESS RELEASE 
FORMAT REPORTS FOR 95 OF THE 100 LARGEST SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1973), 
5. See, e.g., Bell, Running and Busing in Twentieth-Century America, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 
214 (1975). The fact that the Milliken decision has effectively insulated wealthier suburban 
whites from school desegregation has not gone unnoticed by urban working class whites whose 
resistance to intradistrict busing orders has been intensified by what they perceive as deferen-
tial treatment for their more affluent neighbors. 
6. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Supreme Court insured the mainte-
nance of residential segregation in the suburbs by upholding California Constitution art. 
XXXIV, a provision which required referendum approval of low-rent public housing and had 
the demonstrable impact of excluding racial minorities. See Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), 
But cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (where the Supreme Court distinguished 
Milliken on the basis of a court's limited equity jurisdiction and noted that since the 
defendant public housing agency (HUD) had violated the Constitution, and since HUD's 
authority encompassed the suburbs as well as the city of Chicago, it was therefore appropriate 
to order that integrated public housing be built in the suburbs.) 
7. 418 U.S.at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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has changed its status from news to well-established precedent.s It 
deserves a closer look not because Justice Marshall's fears of politi-
cal motivation were unfounded, nor because people take Supreme 
Court opinions more seriously once they have been cited in subse-
quent cases, but because a closer look at the Chief Justice's opinion 
will reveal a reflection of perceived public mood which is even more 
disturbing than a momentary capitulation to modern-day antibus-
ing forces. 
The central inadequacy of the Milliken opinion was the Court's 
refusal to recognize the true nature of segregation as an institution 
in this country. The purpose of this article is (1) to explore just what 
the Supreme Court has "misunderstood"9 or chosen not to articulate 
about the reality of segregation; (2) to demonstrate that the Court's 
misunderstanding results not from lack of evidence clarifying segre-
gation's real meaning and import, but rather from a conscious deci-
sion to ignore the obvious meaning of that evidence; and (3) to 
demonstrate that once segregation is properly understood, the 
court's differing treatment of northern (de facto) and southern (de 
jure) school segregation is unsound and bears reexamination. 
Part I of the article begins with a brief recapitulation of the 
Milliken opinion itself. III It notes that the majority opinion's empha-
8. Since its rendering, the Milliken decision has been authoritatively cited in 16 appel. 
late courts and six district courts as precedent. ' 
9. The word "misunderstood" will be used euphemistically throughout this article to 
refer to the Court's refusal to recognize and articulate the true nature of racial segregation. 
The author believes that this refusal was more the product of an intentional and knowledgea. 
ble decision than the result of any inability to comprehend. See text accompanying notes 107· 
31 infra. However, "misunderstood" offers a useful shorthand and takes into account the 
possibility that the oppressor is never fully able to comprehend the true nature of his oppres· 
sion. 
10. The Milliken decision was selected as the primary vehicle for analysis in this article 
because it marked the first occasion since Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which 
the Court's failure to correctly identify and articulate the injury inflicted by school segrega· 
tion resulted in an adverse decision for black plaintiffs. See text accompanying notes 107·31 
infra. Moreover, due to the Court's reliance on the lack of inter·district injury as a basis for 
rejecting inter·district relief, the decision provides a particularly appropriate context in which 
to explore the current ramifications of the Supreme Court's failure to correctly identify the 
nature of the injury inflicted by segregation. 
More recently, federal court decisions relying on Milliken have underscored the signifi· 
cance of the impact of that decision on the future of school desegregation litigation. See 
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977); Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963, 
alf'g per curiam 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 
(8th Cir.), aff'g and modifying en bane 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.), eert. denied, 423 U.S. 
951 (1975); Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 50.1 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 
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sis on the limitations on the equitable powers of federal courts di-
verts our attention from the initial and necessarily precedent in-
quiry concerning the nature, source, and scope of the injury to plain-
tiffs. It argues that the Milliken decision reflected the Court's mis-
understanding of how segregation injures black children and that 
this misunderstanding resulted in the Court's failure to recognize 
the full scope of the constitutional violation involved in that case. 
Part II of the article discusses three characteristics of the insti-
tution racial segregation which must be recognized before one can 
understand the nature and scope of the injury which segregated 
schools inflict on black children: (a) racial segregation injures 
blacks by labeling them as inferior; (b) the existence of a system of 
racial segregation, not particular segregating acts, operates to injure 
black individuals; and (c) once the state has successfully estab-
lished and institutionalized racial segregation, the institution is 
self-perpetuating and need not be actively maintained. Considering 
these three fundamental characteristics of segregation, the article 
maintains that because governmental involvement in the establish-
ment of a racially segregated society was not significantly different 
in the North and the South, the affirmative duty to disestablish 
segregation should apply uniformly throughout the country. 
In Part III, the article traces the development of the Supreme 
Court's approach to segregation from Plessy v. Ferguson ll through 
Brown v. Board of Education,12 in order to demonstrate that, far 
from being an aberration, the Milliken Court's "misunderstanding" 
is well established in precedent and has its roots in Brown. 
In Part IV, the Milliken decision is reconsidered in light of the 
analytical framework proposed in Part II. 
Part V analyzes three recent Supreme Court decisions 13 that 
rely on Milliken to curtail intra-district relief, and suggests that 
these cases do an injustice to blacks not so much because they have 
limited the scope of relief but because they have refused to acknowl-
edge that blacks have been injured. 
1974), rev'g in part 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975). For 
a more detailed discussion of the Milliken approach as utilized in more recent interdistrict 
desegregation cases, see Note, lnterdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 521 (1975). 
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
13. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977); Austin Indep. School Dist. 
v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 
(1976). 
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The article concludes that the Supreme Court's failure to ac-
curately identify and articulate the nature of the injury inflicted by 
segregation is not so much an indication of its failure to understand 
segregation as it is a reflection of the nation's la.ck of commitment 
to achieving true equality for blacks. 
I. THE MILLIKEN DECISION 
In 1970 the Detroit branch of the NAACP, joined by individual 
parents and students, instituted a class action suit against various 
state and local school district officials seeking relief from alleged 
illegal racial segregation in the Detroit public school system. The 
trial court, having found that the Detroit public school system was 
segregated on the basis of race as the result of official conduct and 
having further found that a solely intra-district remedy would result 
in increased rather than decreased segregation of the Detroit 
schools,14 subsequently deemed that the desegregation proposals 
were inadequate and established a desegregation panel and ordered 
it to prepare a remedial plan consolidating the Detroit school system 
and fifty-three surrounding suburban school districts}" The Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's order 
on the ground that, in view of the racial composition of the Detroit 
school system, the only feasible remedy required the crossing of 
boundary lines between the Detroit school district and adjacent or 
nearby school districts. 16 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. 17 
Although the Supreme Court opinion discussed at some l~ngth 
what it saw as practical problems which would be encountered in 
the consolidation of numerous school districts by judicial decree, its 
decision to reject the metropoliton desegregation order of the trial 
court actually turned on what it considered to be fundamentallimi-
14. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Because the Detroit public school population 
was already 63.8% black in 1970 and increasing at a greater rate than the black population 
of the city of Detroit, the district court found that a desegregation plan limited to that city 
would result in the district being perceived as an all-black district and that the resulting 
exodus of whites from the city would in the long run increase rather than decrease segregation. 
ld. at 585-87. The phenomena of "white flight," the mass emigration of whites from neighbor-
hoods once large numbers of blacks have arrived, has been well documented in the context 
of housing as well as schools. See Farley, School Integration and White Flight, in SYMPOSIUM 
ON SCHOOL INTEGRATION & WHITE FLIGHT 2 (Center for National Policy Review, Autumn, 
1975), 
15. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
16. 484 F.2d 215, 250 (6th Cir. 1973). 
17. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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tations on the remedial powers of the federal courts. The Court said, 
"A federal remedial power may be exercised 'only on the basis of a 
constitutional violation' and, '[a]s with any equity case, the nature 
of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.' "18 As applied 
to the instant case, the Court held that: 
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school dis-
tricts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for 
remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it 
must first be shown that there has been a constitutional viola-
tion within one district that produces a significant segregative 
effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that 
racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, 
or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of 
interdistrict segregation. 'u 
By focusing attention on the limits of the remedial powers of 
the federal courts,2t1 Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion would 
lead one to believe that this decision turns on neutral principles of 
law. In fact, the issue of the scope of the courts' equitable power is 
a straw man. It is incontrovertible that the equitable power of the 
federal courts is limited to the correction of constitutional viola-
tions. The significant question, however, and what was really before 
the Court, was the definition of the "constitutional violation." By 
holding that the Detroit district court's choice of an inter-district 
remedy was in error, and that only an intra-district remedy was 
warranted by the facts, the Supreme Court necessarily found that 
there was no "constitutional violation" existing outside of the 
boundaries of the Detroit school systcm.21 In so finding, the Court 
18. [d. at 738, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 16 
(1971 !. 
19. 418 U.S. at 744-45. 
20. Chief Justice Burger said, "Viewing the record asa whole, it seems clear that the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals shifted the primary focus from a Detroit remedy to 
the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion that total desegregation of Detroit 
would not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable." [d. at 739-40 (em-
phasis added!. While the trial court recognized that the inter-district remedy would be the 
only effective one and emphasized that fact, this does not preclude the possibility that the 
remedy may have beel! appropriate for other reasons, that is, that the injury to be remedied 
extended beyond 'the boundaries of the Detroit district. 
21. "The record before us ... contains evidence of de jure segregated conditions only 
in the Detroit schools .... Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within 
the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited 
to that system." 418 U.S. at 745-46 (emphasis added). The Court noted the presence of "one 
possible interdistrict violation" on the record but dismissed it as "comparatively isolated." 
[d. at 748. 
Fall 1977) SEGREGATION MISUNDERSTOOD 21 
declined to find an overall pattern of state involvement, and im-
pliedly defined and limited the meaning of "constitu~ional viola-
tion" to be evidence in the record of specific (and relatively recent)22 
statutory provisions or purposeful acts by the state or local school 
district directed at the creation or maintenance of segregated 
schools. 23 
It is the inadequacy of this definition that lies at the heart of 
the Milliken decision's deficiencies. The definition is derived from 
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, a distinc-
tion which was first fully articulated by the Supreme Court in Keyes 
v. School District No.1. 24 In Keyes the Court described two kinds 
of school segregation: de jure segregation and de facto segregation.2!i 
The Court held that only de jure segregation violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. De jure segregation 
was defined as "a current condition of' segregation resulting from 
intentional state action directed specifically to the [segregated] 
schools. "26 The Court emphasized that "the differentiating factor 
between de jure segregation and so called de facto segregation. . . 
is purpose or intent to segregate,"27 and went on to give a rather 
detailed list of the kind of evidence which must be produced for the 
record in order to establish segregative purpose or intent. 2R 
22. By "relatively recent" I allude to the distinction which has been made by the court 
in post-Brown desegregation cases between segregation by law or other state action which was 
in existence at the time of the Brown decision (1954) or thereafter (which it has called de 
jure), and identical segregative laW!! or acts which pre-date Brown (which it does not consider 
evidence of de jure segregation). For discussion of the inadequacies of this distinction, see 
text accompanying notes 76-106 infra. 
23. While the Milliken majority relied on the guidelines set forth in Keyes v. School Dist. 
No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), regarding policies and practices with respect to school location, 
size and renovational additions, attendance zones, student and faculty assignment and trans-
fer options, transportation of students, etc.; it specifically rejected the dissent's argument by 
analogy to the Keyes case that, having demonstrated de jure segregation by the state in 
. Detroit, the same constitutional violation should be attributable by inference to the state as 
a whole. 418 U.S. at 748. 
24. 413 U.S. 189 (1973l. 
25. While Keyes was the first northern desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court, 
lower federal courts used the de facto/de jure dichotomy as early as 1961. See Deal v. Cincin-
nati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. 
Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (lOth Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School 
City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Taylor v. Board 
of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961l. 
26. 413 U .S.at 205-06. 
27. [d. at 208 (emphasis in original), citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. I, 17-18 (1971). 
28. 413 U.S. at 213-14. See note 23 supra. 
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Thus, Justice Brennan's opinion in Keyes achieved results 
which were applauded by proponents of school desegregation be-
cause it eased the plaintiff's burden of proving segregative intent in 
northern districts. The requirement of evidentiary demonstration of 
segregative purpose or intent as a prerequisite to the Court's finding 
a constitutional violation, even though less burdensome, nonethe-
less reinforced the distinction between northern and southern cases; 
it thereby created an obstacle in Milliken and lies at the root of the 
Court's failure to redress injuries suffered by black children in the 
Detroit schools. 29 
Besides imposing evidentiary limitations upon proving consti-
tutional violations, the Supreme Court's use of the de jure and de 
facto labels has circumscribed its analysis and understanding of the 
constitutional rights subject to violation by segregation and subject 
to redress by the courts' remedial powers. The Court has attempted 
to draw a distinction between segregation which is mandated by law 
or results from purposeful or intentional state action and segrega-
tion which results "randomly"311 or without purposeful or intentional 
action by the state or government. While the Court does not deny 
that de facto segregation may injure the black child,31 it holds that 
29 .. In southern school districts, where segregation was required or sanctioned by statute 
at the time of Brown (1954), the Court presumed that the segregation had resulted from 
intentional state action and the only question before the Court was the scope of relief. Keyes 
v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), was the first non-southern school desegregation 
case to reach the Supreme Court, and thus, defined the Court's initial position on how it 
would approach school desegregation in states where segregation was not statutorily enforced 
at the time of Brown. In Keyes, the Court made clear that, unlike those cases involving 
southern districts, plaintiffs suing northern school districts would be required to produce 
evidence of the school district's intent to segregate. See text accompanying notes 76-106 infra. 
The Court held that once plaintiffs made a prima facie case establishing intent to segregate 
which affected a substantial portion of the school district, the entire school district would be 
presumed to be intentionally segregated. 413 U.S. at 207-08. Civil rights attorneys were 
pleased with the decision; while plaintiffs in northern desegregation suits still had the eviden-
tiary burden of establishing intent, the Keyes presumption made that task substantially 
easier. Id. at 208- 10. 
30. As used here, "randomly" connotes lack of evidence of state motivation to segregate. 
Professor Ely, in Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, argues 
that judicial review of allegations of discrimination should be triggered only by proof of racial 
"motivation." 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). He assumes that "random" results are the baseline 
against which to examine the racial motivation underlying the acts of school authorities. Of 
course there is considerable difficulty in determining what is a "random" result in a society 
which is thoroughly permeated with discrimination of racially motivated origins. 
For a detailed discussion of the problem of determining "segregative intent" in school 
cases, see Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De 
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976), 
31. In contrast to the Supreme Court's relaxed attitude regarding potential harmful 
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it is not an injury which is attributable to the state and that, there-
fore, the injured child has no protected "right" under the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendmentY Because no 
"right" has been violated, the Court is without power to effect a 
remedy or ameliorate the injury to the child.33 Thus, because the 
Milliken Court misunderstood the nature of the injury inflicted 
upon Detroit school children, it failed to find the requisite state 
involvement in the inter-district infliction of that injury and 
thereby fashion an inter-district remedy. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE INSTITUTION OF 
SEGREGATION 
In order to recognize the full scope of the constitutional injury 
inflicted by a segregated school system, one must understand how 
the institution of segregation functions. Three underlying character-
istics of segregation crucial to this understanding are: it labels black 
children as inferior; the existence of the institution as a whole, 
rather than particular acts, constitutes the injury; and the institu-
tion is self-perpetuating. 
A. Segregation's Only Purpose is to Label Blacks 
as Inferior 
What right is insured to black school children by the imperative 
that they not be denied equal protection of the law? It is important 
to remember that the basic right protected by the equal protection 
clause is the right not to be classified or labeled in a way that results 
effects of de facto segregation, J. Skelly Wright, speaking for the district court in Washington, 
D.C., noted: 
The complaint that, analytically no violation of equal protection vests unless 
the inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false. 
Whatever the law was once, it is a testament to our maturing concept of equality 
that, with the help of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly 
recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and 
unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful 
scheme. 
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
32. The Supreme Court has held the provisions of the 14th amendment applicable to 
"state" as opposed to "private" action. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The four-
teenth amendment provides in part, that: "No State shall make or enforce any law ... nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
33. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 744-57 (Burger, C.J., majority opinion and Stewart, 
J., concurring opinion). 
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in one being treated differently or unequally for no legitimate rea-
son,:14 
In general, the equal protection clause requires that when the 
state classifies or labels persons for purposes of treating them differ-
ently, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate 
state purpose,a;, Further, if persons are classified or labeled accord-
ing to their race, the state must demonstrate a compelling justifica-
tion for its disparate treatment of racial groups,3fi 
The holding in Brown v, Board of Education:17 that racially 
segregated schools are inherently unequaPR makes most sense if it 
is understood as a recognition of the fact that racial segregation by 
definition is an invidious labeling device and therefore must violate 
the equal protection clause,3u In abandoning the "separate but 
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,40 it should have been clear to 
the Court that the injury to black children did not result solely from 
unequal resource allocation,41 nor from the fact that they were re-
34. It is notable that segregationists fought the reversal of Brown in the courts on the 
ground that racial classification was based on legitimate innate differences in the races. See 
III Defellse of School Segregation, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEGREGATIONIST ThOUGHT 146 (LA. 
Newby, ed. 1968). 
35. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). See generally 
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949), 
36. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343-44 (1974) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
38. "We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495. 
39. Unfortunately, the Court's seemingly insightful recognition of the inherent inequal-
ity of segregated facilities was based not upon the simple logic that separation of a group for 
the sole purpose of defining or labeling them as inferior creates a classification with an 
impermissible purpose that necessarily violates the equal protection clause, .but upon the 
controversial sociological evidence cited in the famous footnote l1./d. at 494-95 n.l1. See note 
60 infra and text accompanying note 126 infra. 
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
41. Of course, separate but equal was never a reality even with respect· to tangible 
resources. Black schools in segregated systems systematically received fewer. goods and serv-
ices and still do. For example, in all three of the companion cases to Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), considered in 1954, Briggs v. Elliot Davis v. County School Bd., and 
Gebhart v. Belton, the trial courts found that the the Negro schools were inferior to the white 
schools in physical plant, curricula, transportation, etc. Id. at 486-88 n.1. It was Charles 
Houston's recognition of this reality that lay at the foundation of NAACP'sschool desegrega-
tion strategy. See McNeil, Charles Hamilton Houston, 3 BLACK L.J. 123, 126-29 (1974). See 
also Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 445 F.2d 990 (1971), aff'd, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), where the 
appellate court found that predominantly black and Mexican schools in the "core" area of 
Denver were "educationally inferior." 
While there was no finding of unequal resource allocation in the Brown case, the Court 
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fused the opportunity to sit next to white children in school,42 but 
from the fact that attendance at a separate school was part of the 
system that labeled blacks as inferior and whites as superior. 43 
The institution of segregation and the injury jt inflicts on blacks 
is necessarily misunderstood until one recognizes that its chief pur-
pose is to define, not to separate}4 This fact is best demonstrated 
by a brief examinat.ion of the development of segregation in the 
South. Southern whites had no aversion to commingling with blacks 
so .long as the institution of slavery made their status clear. It was 
only with the demise of slavery that segregation became necessary. 
C. Vann Woodward notes the virtual absence of segregation in the 
found that segregation denied black children "equal educational opportunity" by taking 
judicial notice of empirical data gathered by social scientists: 
[Tlhe policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a 
. child to learn. Segregation ... therefore, has a tendency to [retard) the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children .... " Whatever may have 
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 
347 U.S. at 494 (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of why this basis for the Brown 
decision has been problematic, see note 60 infra and accompanying text. 
42. There is some language in Brown indicating the Court's concern with associational 
rights: "To separate [black children) froin others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 347 U.S. at 494 
(emphasis added). Some legal scholars have mistakingly seized upon this language as if it 
were the central concern of the case. See, e.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I, 31-34 (1959). The chief concern of blacks, however, 
has never been physical or social affinity but access to resources and opportunity. The black 
mother in Roxbury who gets up at 5:30 a.m. to put her child on a METCO bus to a suburban 
school in Newton knows that affluent white suburban parents will see t.hat their children are 
well taught and that if her child is in the same classroom, he will reap the benefits of their 
political and economic power. 
43. Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown dealt only with the inequality 
inherent in segregated schools, subsequent decisions of the Court, often per curiam decisions 
relying on Brown, have made it clear that Brown's identification of segregation with inequal-
ity extended beyond the school setting and that the Court recognized that the entire system 
was inconsistent with the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 
U.S. 526 (1963) (publicly owned parks and recreational facilities); New Orleans City Park 
Improvement Ass'n v. Deteige, 358 U.S. 54, aff'g per curiam 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) 
(public parks); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and 
remanding per curiam 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953) (admission to publicly owned amphithea-
ter). 
44. It is important to recognize the difference between "segregation" in which a politi-
cally powerful group imposes coerced isolation on a less powerful group, and "separation" 
which occurs voluntarily on the part of the less powerful group or fortuitously. Inherent in 
the former is the constitutionally impermissible purpose of continued subordination of the 
less powerful group; no such purpose is present in the latter. See note 61 infra. . 
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South during slavery in his authoritative work on the history of 
segregation, The Strange Career of Jim Crow: 
In most aspects of slavery as practiced in the antebellum 
South, however, segre'gation would have been an inconvenience 
and an obstruction to the functioning of the system. The very 
nature of the institution made separation of the races for the 
most part impracticable. The mere policing of slaves required 
that they be kept under more or less constant scrutiny, and so 
did the exaction of involuntary labor. The supervision, mainte-
nance of order, and physical and medical care of slaves necessi-
tated many contacts and encouraged a 'degree of intimacy be-
tween the races unequaled, and often held distasteful, in other 
parts of the country. The system imposed its own type of inter-
racial contact, unwelcome as it might be on both sides. 45 
Although historians differ in their views of when segregation 
became firmly established as an institution,46 there is virtual unan-
imity concerning its purpose and method. Segregation was an in-
strument of subordination which used a strict and rigid caste system 
to clearly define and limit the social, political and economic mobil-
ity of blacks. The segregation statutes and "Jim Crow" laws were 
the "public symbols and constant reminders"47 of the inferior posi-
tion of blacks. It is the symbolism of segregation that operates to 
violate the fourteenth amendment. Unless Brown is understood in 
this light, it must fail in its purpose of insuring black children equal 
educational opportunity. 4S 
45. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 12 (3d ed. 1974). The absence 
of segregation in the rural slave-holding South was not an indication of racial harmony but 
rather a manifestation of the fact that "[i]n so far as the ... status [of blacks] was fixed 
by enslavement there was little occasion or need for segregation." Id. at 13. 
46. Woodward argues that segregation was not firmly entrenched in the South until the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Id. at 97. Other historians, however, contend that while 
the modern day pattern of segregating legislation did not appear until the 1890's, a highly 
rigid order of de facto segregation was widespread soon after emancipation and continued 
substantially unchanged throughout reconstruction. For a catalogue of the views on the 
historical development of segregation, see J. WILLIAMSON, ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION (1968). 
47. C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 7. 
48. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), the first race discrimination case 
to reach the Supreme Court after the Civil War, the court relied in part on the right of blacks 
to be free from stigmatic harm. Justice Strong reasoned that the fourteenth amendment 
protects Negroes "from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society." Id. at 308. 
Similarly, the fact that segregation imposes a stigma on black students has been noted by 
the Supreme Court in several cases since Brown. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 
804-05 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461 
(1972). See also Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. 
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In response to contemporaneous attacks on the soundness of 
the Brown decision,49 Charles Black wrote an article that is brilliant 
both in its simplicity. and its clarity.50 Professor Black pointed out 
that while attention is usually focused on the inequalities of the 
separate facilities themselves,51 the most significant evidence of the 
inherent inequality of segregation can be found in looking at what 
it means to the people who impose it and to the people who are 
subjected to it: 52 
It is actionable defamation in the south to call a white man a 
Negro. A small portion of Negro "blood" puts one in the inferior 
race for segregation purposes. . . . 
[P]lacing of a white person in a Negro railroad car is an action-
able humiliation. . . ."3 
[I]t would be the most unneutral of principles . . . to require 
that a court faced with the present problem refuse to note a 
plain fact about the society of the United States-the fact that 
the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in 
a position of walled-off inferiority .... 54 
The Brown Court, unfortunately, was not nearly so articulate 
in support of its decision as was Professor Black.55 The Court's unan-
L. REV. I, 8-10 (1976); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional 
Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 568-69 (1965); Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 295 (1972). 
49. See, e.g., Weschler, supra note 42. 
50. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
51. See note 43 supra. 
52. Charles Black, Jr., Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence at the Yale Law School, 
is a southerner, as is C. Vann Woodward. It is interesting that enlightened southern whites 
have been more able and willing to understand the impact of segregation and racism on this 
country than have their northern white liberal brethren. For example, Justice Powell's con-
currence in Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (concurring and dissenting), 
comes closest to a correct approach to the desegregation cases, albeit with a certairi tone of 
southern apology. Note also the insightful opinions of Justice Harlan, dissenting, in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896), and Circuit Judge Wisdom in United States v. Jefferson 
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966). 
53. Black, supra note 50, at 426-27. 
54. Id. at 427. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court, 
in striking down Virginia's law prohibiting intermarriage between white and black persons, 
rejected the argument that the law applies equally to blacks and whites and noted that 
"!tlhe fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demon-
strates that racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed 
to maintain White Supremacy." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
55. The failure of the Brown opinion to directly confront the obvious meaning of segrega-
tion is attributable, in large part, to Chief Justice Earl Warren's desire to secure a unanimous 
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imous decision did find that "[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal,"56 but instead of resting that finding on the 
common knowledge57 that segregation's purpose and function was to 
designate the black race as inferior or less than equal, the Court 
resorted to what it referred to as "intangible considerations". The 
Court said that "[t]o separate [Negro children] from others of 
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates 
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."5R 
The Court then went on to quote the federal district court in Kansas 
which had found that "[a] sense of inferiority [engendered by 
segregated schools] ... has a tendency to [retard] the educa-
tional and mental development of negro children .... "59 
It is not the Supreme Court's emphasis and reliance on the 
psycho-sociological evidence rather than the common-sense ap-
proach that should be faulted,60 but the Court's failure to spell out 
decision from a Court with three southern justices. Richard Kluger, in his epic work on the 
Brown decision, Simple Justice, has noted: 
A more stirring or incandescent opinion might have enthroned Warren as a 
righteous deliverer of the oppressed, but it would more than likely have cost him 
the unanimity of the Court. And a provocative opinion, launched by a divided 
Court, would almost certainly have set the South on fire with anger and defi-
ance. 
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education AND BLACK 
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 713 (1976). 
56. 347 U.S. at 495. 
57. Professor Black noted: 
While no actual doubt exists as to what segregation is for and what kind of 
societal pattern it supports and implements, there is no ritually sanctioned way 
in which the Court, as a Court, can permissibly learn what is obvious to every-
body else and to the Justices as individuals. But surely, confronted with such a 
problem, legal acumen has only one proper task-that of developing ways to 
make it permissible for the Court to use what it knows .... 
That a practice, on massive historical evidence and in common sense, has 
the designed and generally apprehended effect of putting its victims at a disad-
vantage, is enough for law. At least it always has been enough. 
Black, supra note 50, at 427-28. 
58. 347 U.S.at 494. 
59. [d. 
60. While this article will not attempt to examine the validity of the thesis that segrega-
tion operates to damage black children psychologically, it is a thesis that has promoted 
considerable controversy. Much of the social science evidence was considered weak when 
Brown was decided. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 158-61 (1955); van den 
Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth 
Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960). For a retrospective look by the social scientist who offered 
the controversial evidence, see K. Clark, The Social Scientists, The Brown Decision and 
Contemporary Confusion, in ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN 
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the condition precedent for black children's "feelings of inferior-
ity" -the fact that they and everyone else knew that the system of 
segregation defined them as inferior. 61 
It was the Brown Court's failure to confront this simple reality 
about segregation that allowed Chief Justice Burger and the 
Milliken majority to conclude that there was no evidence of state 
involvement in the violation of the Detroit plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights requiring an inter-distr~ct remedy. 62 
If it is the act of separating that violates the equal protection 
clause, then the Detroit children's only right is to be free of specific 
acts of separation by the state and the scope of the remedy turns 
on whether there is sufficient evidence of such specific acts of sepa-
ration. If, however, the equal protection clause protects the right not 
to be labeled or classified on the basis or race, we must look not just 
to whether or not the state was involved in specific separating acts 
but also to whether the state was involved in the creation of the 
socio-political system of segregation that labels segregated black 
children as inferior. 63 It is this principle that must be understood 
before a proper approach to desegregation cases can be developed. 
The Milliken court, having defined the plaintiffs' rights under 
the equal protection clause as the right not to be separated, looked 
only for evidence of state involvement in intentional acts of 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952-55, at xxxi (L. Friedman ed. 1969) 
[hereinafter cited as ARGUMENT). 
For more recent challenges to the empirical basis of the Court's finding, see Goodman, 
.~upra note 48, at 426-27; St. John, Desegregation and Minority Group Performance .. 40 REv. 
EDUC. RESEARCH III (1970). Compare Armor, The Evidence on Busing 28 PUB. INT. 90 (1972) 
with Pettigrew, Vseem, Normand & Smith, Busing: A Review of "The Evidence", 30 PUB. 
INT. 88 (1973). 
61. Interestingly enough, the Court has recognized that segregation operates as a device 
to define blacks as inferior in another context. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968), involving discrimination in housing, the Court discussed the congressional power to 
enforce the thirteenth amendment: 
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the free exercise 
of those rights, were substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes 
from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when 
racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy 
property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery. 
[d. at 442-43. 
62. 418 U.S. at 746-47. 
63. Note that it is the absence of whites in a school that attaches to it the label 
"segregated." All-white schools or districts are rarely so labeled. See, e.g., Massachusetts 
Racial Imbalance Statute, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, §§ 37C, 370 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 
1977) (requiring local boards of education to eliminate segregation within their districts). In 
Massachusetts, "racial imbalance" is defined as "the condition of a public school in which 
more than fifty percent of the pupils attending the school are non-white.'.' [d. § 370. 
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separation of school children by race. Because this misunderstan-
ding of the nature of segregation caused the Court to misconstrue 
the scope of those rights and thus to ignore pertinent evidence, the 
Court found no evidence of state involvement in the violation of 
Detroit plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
B. Black Children Are Injured by the Existence of the 
System of Segregation Not by Particular Segregating Acts 
A second aspect of the Court's misunderstanding of segregation 
is related to the Court's adoption of the-requirement that evidence 
of particular segregative acts by a school district exist before a fed-
eral judge may order relief against that district. Milliken adopted 
this requirement from Keyes u. School District No.1, 64 wherein the 
Court found that there must be evidence that the racial imbalance 
in the schools was brought about by discriminatory actions of state 
authorities. 65 
The Keyes/Milliken requirement of evidence of particular seg-
regative acts by a school district before a federal court may order 
relief against that district demonstrates a second and related aspect 
of the Court's misunderstanding of segregation. Because segrega-
tion's purpose and function is to define or classify blacks as inferior, 
the injury which it inflicts is systemic rather than particular. Black 
school children are not injured by the fact that a school board has 
placed them in a school different than that. in which it has placed 
white school children so much as by the fact that the school exists 
within a system that defines it as the inferior school and its pupils 
as inferior persons. 66 
Many black schools that existed within the segregated school 
systems of the South were in fact superior to their white counter-
parts.67 It is ironic that most of these schools achieved their ex cell-
64. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
65. [d. at 203. 
66. White parents who resist efforts to bus their children to "black" neighborhoods often 
complain that they are being bussed to "inferior" schools. This perception of the quality of 
the school results as often as not from the schools being identified as black rather than from 
any notion of the quality of teaching or facilities. 
67. Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C., exemplified such institutions. "In the 
period 1918·1923, Dunbar graduates earned 15 degrees from Ivy League colleges and universi· 
ties, and 10 degrees from Amherst, Williams, and Wesleyan." Sowell, Black Excellence: the 
Case of Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INT. 3, 7 (1974). 
Such institutions were, of course, exceptions; as a rule, black schools were and are the 
recipient of fewer educational resources and by most objective standards are inferior. 
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ence as a direct result of the discrimination inherent in a segregated 
society, in that the best black professionals were forced into teach-
ing by their virtual exclusion from other fields. 68 The existence of 
such schools violated the constitutional rights of children attending 
them, not because a school board or state legislature had taken steps 
to see that white children did not attend them, and certainly not 
because of the relative quality of education they provided, but be-
cause they were pieces of a larger puzzle which, when fitted to-
gether, plainly spelled out the words "if you're black, get back. "69 
Once it is understood that segregation functions as a systemic 
labeling device, it should be clear that any state action which results 
in the maintenance of the segregated system is a direct and proxi-
mate cause of the injuries suffered by black children in segregated 
schools and is in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Evidence of such action would, of course, 
not be limited to acts directly resulting in one-race schools. Segre-
gated housing and zoning practices are equally effective means of 
labeling blacks as inferior. 70 If the state discriminates by continuing 
to participate in labeling blacks "not fit to live with, "71 it is surely 
68. In his study of Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C., Thomas Sowell found: 
Dunbar [had) its choice of teachers with outstanding academic credentials. 
Four of its first eight principals graduated from Oberlin and"two from Harvard. 
Some had graduate degrees as well. Dunbar had three Ph.D.'s on its teaching 
staff in the 1920's, due to the almost total exclusion of blacks from most college 
and university faculties. (It was 1942 before there was a black senior faculty 
member at any major university-and he was a Dunbar graduate.) 
[d. at 6. 
69. "If you're black get back. If you're white, you're all right." 
70. Taboos dealing with who one lives with or near have always been important elements 
of caste systems. See generally C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS (1955); J. DENTON, APARTH-
EID AMERICAN STYLE (1967); R. FORMAN, BLACK GHETTOS, WHITE GHETTOS AND SLUMS (1971); 
R. WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHETTO (1948). 
71. In Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), the Court distinguished Milliken and 
found sufficient federal involvement in the exclusion of blacks from public housing in subur-
ban communities to order a metropolitan remedy. [d. at 297. While the Court may attempt 
to distinguish Milliken on the basis of the milieu of education as compared to housing, or on 
the basis of the limited jurisdiction of a defendant local school board as compared to a 
defendant federal housing agency, this distinction is a technical one and ignores two funda-
mental principles. First, the city school board is an instrumentality of the state and should 
not be examined in isolation so as to ignore and eliminate other evidence of state involvement 
in the perpetuation of segregaton. Second, a technical distinction such as the jurisdictional 
authority of the defendant ignores the true and underlying constitutional injury that is perva-
sive: the systemic injury of labeling blacks as inferior. Upon examining these two cases, it 
appears that the court has taken a very restrictive view in categorizing the injury, thus 
limiting the relevant evidence that will determine the ultimate remedy in school desegrega-
tion cases. In contrast, the Court appears more receptive to considering evidence of an injury 
requiring a metropolitan remedy in a non-education desegregation case such as Hills. 
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beside the point that it is not an active participant in particular acts 
labeling blacks "not fit to go to school with." 
Chief Justice Burger and his colleagues in the Milliken major-
ity, in what can only be described as "selective perception," have 
blinded themselves to this seemingly obvious reality. The following 
quote exemplifies their myopia: 
Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred 
within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere .... 
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing 
in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district .. 
Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory 
fashion, or arranged for white students residing in the Detroit 
District to attend schools in Oakland and Macomb Counties, 
they were under no constitutional duty to make provisions for 
Negro students to do SO.72 
There is no claim and there is no evidence hinting that peti-
tioner outlying school districts and their predecessors, or the 30-
odd other school districts in the tricounty area . . . have ever 
maintained or operated anything but unitary school systems. 73 
Because Justice Burger limits the right of black children to 
freedom from acts by the state aimed at segregating the schools, 
such specific acts are the only kind of evidence he looks for in deter-
mining that there has been no violation for which inter-district relief 
would be appropriate.74 
Once the true nature of segregation is understood, it should 
become equally apparent that because segregation injures by labels 
or classification rather than by separation itself, the scope of that 
injury cannot be defined by school district lines. State sanction of 
the purposeful segregation of schools in Detroit operates to stigma-
tize black children throughout the state. They do not escape that 
stigma merely by virtue of the fact -that the defamation against 
72. 418 U.S. at 746-47 (emphasis added). 
73. [d. at 748-49. 
74. Justice Stewart, concurring, indicated that in his view "purposeful, racially discrimi-
natory use of state housing or zoning laws" in order to maintain a segregated school system 
would also constitute a violation of black children's rights and justify cross-district relief. [d. 
at 755. While Justice Stewart was not explicit about why he parts ways with the Burger 
majority at this point, he apparently recognized that the presence of segregated housing 
operated to injure black children in dual fashion. First, the exclusion of their families from 
lily-white neighborhoods effectively excluded them from those neighborhoods. Second, the 
segregation of housing itself operated as part of the system that labeled them as inferior. 
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them occurred in another district; its publication extends through-
out the state.75 
c. Why Draw the Line at 19541 The Fallacy of the 
North/South, DeJure/DeFacto Distinction 
The Court's misunderstanding of the nature of segregation is 
perhaps best demonstrated by its failure to apply a consistent con-
stitutional standard to southern (de jure) and northern (so-called de 
facto) varieties of segregation.76 Since de jure, as compared to de 
facto segregation, is found to arise by virtue of intentional acts of 
the state, this distinction is at bottom a state action question. 77 
Although all segregation may result in injury to black children, the 
factual question which must be resolved by the court is whether the 
state can be held responsible.78 In states which had laws or express 
policies mandating segregation at the time of Brown the answer was 
clear: this was 'de jure segregation and clearly unconstitutional 
under Brown. 79 
In 1973, the court found that de jure segregation may also exist 
in the northern and western states where school segregation was not 
mandated by law in 1954.80 There is, however, an important differ-
75. As J. Skelly Wright so aptly noted: "Rather, the function of equal protection here is 
to shield groups or individuals from stigmatization by government. Whether or not particular 
legislation stigmatizes is largely a sociological question requiring consideration of the struc-
ture and history of our society as well as examination of the statute itself." Wright, The Role 
of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 18 (1968). 
Our tort law has recognized the need for affirmative relief when the injury of defamation 
is involved. While retraction is not a remedy, it may serve to mitigate damages. 
A retraction, as such, however, can be effective only if it is a full and unequivocal 
one, which does not contain lurking insinuations, hypothetical or hesitant with-
drawals or new calumnies in disguise. It must, in short, be an honest endeaver 
[sic] to repair all of the wrong done by the defamatory imputation, or it will 
merely aggravate the original offense .... The retraction must, in general, be 
given the same publicity and prominence as the defamation. 
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 800 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted) .. See note 134 infra. 
76. See Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, supra note 30. 
1'7. See notes 24-33 supra and accompanying text. 
78. In light of the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has 
held that only state-sponsored de jure segregation violates the equal protection clause. See 
cases cited notes 25 and 32 supra. 
79. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green 
v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 
218 (1964); Goss v. Board ~f Educ., '373 U.S. 683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
80. Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Northern and western cases follow-
ing Keyes have been based on the standard for determining liability set forth in that case. 
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ence relating to the evidentiary burdens between the Court's ap-
proach to establishing the presence of de jure segregation in the 
North and its approach to the same problem in the South. In the 
North the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the state's direct 
and causal involvement in the segregation of schools,sl while in the 
South the Court has held that the burden is on the defendant school 
district to demonstrate that it has acted affirmatively and success-
fully to dismantle a previously existing segregated school system. 
Proof of the absence of laws mandating segregation or continuing 
purposeful segregating acts by the state is not enough. 
In Green v. County School Board82 the defendant Virginia 
school district asserted the constitutionality of its "freedom-of-
choice" plan by arguing that it was no longer directly involved in 
maintaining or perpetuating a segregated school system. The Court 
unequivocally rejected that argument arid held that the school dis-
tricthad an affirmative duty to convert to a unitary system: 
In the context of the state-imposed segregated pattern of long 
standing, the fact that in 1965 the Board opened the doors of the 
former "white" school to Negro children and of the "Negro" 
school to white children merely begins, not ends, our inquiry 
whether the Board has taken steps adequate to abolish its dual, 
segregated system.S3 
Although the rejection of "freedom-of-choice" in Green appears 
to have been brought on by the Supreme Court's loss of patience 
with various southern schemes designed to resist school desegrega-
tion,8~ the Court indicated that the affirmative duty requirement 
grew directly out of the second Brown decision, Brown II,8!i wherein 
See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1975) (Boston). 
81. See note 29 supra. 
82. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
83. [d. at 437. 
84. In Green, the Court considered whether the school board had adequately responded 
to the command of Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), that affirmative steps be taken to eliminate 
racial discrimination and convert to unitary systems: 
In determining whether respondent School Board met that command by 
adopting its "freedom-of-choice" plan, it is relevant that this first step did not 
come until some 11 years after Brown [ was decided and 10 years after Brown II 
directed the making of a "prompt and reasonable start." This deliberate perpe-
tuation of the unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the 
harm of such a system. Such delays are no longer tolerable for "the governing 
constitutional principles no longer bear the imprint of newly enunciated doc-
trine." 
391 U.S. at 438, quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529 (1963). 
85. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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the Supreme Court set forth broad desegregation guidelines for the 
implementation of Brown (1): 
Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual 
systems tempered by an awareness that complex and multifa-
ceted problems would arise which would require time and flexi-
bility for a successful resolution. School boards such as the res-
pondent then operating state-compelled dual systems were nev-
ertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take what-
ever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch.86 
The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a 
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realisti-
cally to work now. 87 
Thus, according to the Court's language in Green, the affirmative 
duty requirement is limited to those school systems that were segre-
gated by operation of law in 1954 when Brown was decided. 
It is not clear, however, why the affirmative duty to desegregate 
should only be made applicable to school boards which were operat-
ing state-compelled dual systems at the time of Brown. 88 Dual sys-
tems in northern school districts have proven to be more firmly 
entrenched than those in the South. 89 The argument that in the 
North there is no evidence of recent governmental participation in 
acts directly resulting in the segregation of schools was the very 
argument advanced by the New Kent School Board in Green and 
rejected by the Court. 
It could be argued that the northern and southern cases are 
distinguishable on the basis of state action; in the South, state 
action is present because state laws required the operation of dual 
school systems, while in the North, state action is absent because 
segregated schools occurred as the result of segregated housing pat-
86. 391 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis added). 
87. [d. at 439 (emphasis in original). 
88. "[T)hen operating state-compelled dual systems," id. at 437, has been read to mean 
schools segregated by law in 1954. Note that the Topeka school system, the defendant in 
Brown, had instituted a segregated school system mandated by law as recently as the early 
1950's. Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D.Kan. 1951). 
89. In the period 1968-1971, the' percentage of black students in the 11 southern states 
attending 80-100% minority schools was reduced from 78.8% to 32.2%; the change in the 
remaining states during the same period was negligible. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 3, at 110-11. 
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terns. This distinction, however, neglects the entire history of segre-
gation in America. 
Segregation is northern, not southern, in origin and reached 
considerable maturity in the North before moving south in full 
force. Do Leon F. Litwack's North of Slavery, an authoritative ac-
count of the treatment of blacks above the Mason-Dixon Line, 
should be instructive to those who have been led to believe that 
segregation was a uniquely southern legal institution. In describing 
conditions in the North, circa 1860, Professor Litwack' noted: 
In virtually every phase of existence, Negroes found themselves 
systematically separated from whites. They were either ex-
cluded from railway cars, omnibuses, stagecoaches, and steam-
boats or assigned to special "Jim Crow" sections; they sat, when 
permitted, in secluded and remote corners of theaters and lec-
ture halls; they could not enter most hotels, restaurants, and 
resorts, except as servants; they prayed in "Negro pews" in the 
white churches, and if partaking of the sacrament of the Lord's 
Supper, they waited until the whites had been served the bread 
and wine. Moreover, they were often educated in segregated 
schools, punished in segregated prisons, nursed in segregated 
hospitals, and buried in segregated cemeteries.vl 
90. C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 17. 
91. L.F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 97 (U. Chi. Press.1961) (emphasis added). Lit-
wack's more detailed discussion of separate and unequal education in the Ncii'th is equally 
instructive: 
The means employed to exclude Negroes from the public schools varied 
only slightly from state to state. In New England, local school committees 
usually assigned Negro children to separate institutions, regardless of the dis-
trict in which they resided. Pennsylvania and Ohio, although extending their 
public school privileges to all children, required district school directors to es-
tablish separate facilities for Negro students whenever twenty or more could be 
accommodated. The New York legislature authorized any school district, upon 
the approval of a town's school commissioners, to provide for segregation. The 
newer states frequently excluded Negroes from all public education, but by 
1850, most of them had consented to separate instruction. In the absence of legal 
restrictions, custom and popular prejudice often excluded Negro children from 
the schools. For example, an Indianan noted in 1850 that the laws provided no 
racial distinction in the state school system, but "the whites rose en-masse, and 
said your children shall not go to schools with our children, and they were 
consequently expelled. Thus, then, we see that in this respect, there is a higher 
'law than the Constitutional law." By the 1830's, statute or custom placed Negro 
children in separate schools in nearly every northern community. 
Proposals to educate Negroes invariably aroused bitter controversy, partic-
ularly in the new western states. The admission of Negroes to white schools, 
opponents maintained, would result in violence and prove fatal to public educa-
tion. Moreover, some contended that Negroes, "after a certain age, did not 
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Based on historical fact, it cannot be refuted that the official 
actions of northern, midwestern and western states played a pre-
dominant role in the entrenchment of segregation within their bor-
ders.92 In view of the fact that there was substantial state activity 
in the promulgation of segregation throughout the nation, the fact 
that the northern states ceased official enforcement of a segregated 
school system prior to 1954, while the southern states continued to 
do so officially, does not appear to be an adequate rationale for 
exempting northern states from the mandate of Brown, as further 
elucidated by Green. Thus, the Supreme Court's distinction be-
tween northern and southern cases of desegregation is not really a 
matter of state action at all, and is simply a matter of-timing. 
Although the Supreme Court holdings dictate a chronological 
distinction between pre- and post-1954 legislation, the Court's 
reasoning in Green would appear to counsel the contrary conclusion 
that the cases be treated on the basis of their facts and not be 
categorized by region or date. Green stands for the propositon that 
where a system of segregation remains firmly entrenched the state 
must do more than cease and desist from further official support of 
the system; it must act affirmatively to disestablish that system.93 
Once it is understood that segregation achieves its purpose by label-
ing blacks as inferior, it becomes clear that segregation is firmly 
entrenched when the label of inferiority is reflected in societal atti-
tudes;9~ moreover, once the label is firmly affixed, it will not be 
removed or alleviated by a mere discontinuance of official name-
correspondingly advance in learning-their intellect being apparently incapable 
of being cultured beyond a particular point." ... Opponents also warned that 
equal educational privileges would encourage Negro immigration and antago-
nize southern-born residents. On the basis of such a pretext, a California mayor 
vetoed appropriations for Negro schools as "particularly obnoxious to those of 
our citizens who have immigrated from Southern States." The city aldermen 
defended his action with a warning against placing the two races on an equal 
basis, "not withstanding the distinction stamped by Divinity between them." 
[d. at 114-16 (footnotes omitted). 
92. The segregation of federal programs and facilities such as the armed forces should 
also be noted. See note 100 infra and accompanying text. Federal involvement in the estab-
lishment of segregation operated to injure blacks throughout the country and thus to abridge 
their rights under the fifth amendment. 
93. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. 
94. "Behavior change can be induced by the application of many kinds of external 
pressure, ranging from legal enforcement to neighborhood custom. But a genuine translation 
of such behavior into an enduring change in attitude is a long process involving important 
psychological processes." GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRIC AsPECTS 
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 31 (1957). 
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calling.u;; This understanding applies to all instances of segregation 
and knows no geographic distinctions. 
The state has acted to establish a self-perpetuating institu-
tion.u6 Because there has been no affirmative action by the state to 
disestablish the institution, it remains intact. The segregated sys-
tems of the North and West are not "de facto". They have not 
occurred in the absence of official action. Rather, they are creatures 
of the state and the affirmative duty to destroy them that was 
imposed on the New Kent School District in Green should be uni-
versally applicable.97 
Without doubt, it will be argued that the causal link between 
constitutional violations existing in northern states in the distant 
past and presently segregated schools is too tenuous to support the 
application of the Green standard to those districts. At the root of 
this argument is the belief that racial segregation in the North, as 
we know it today, is the result of the ingrained racial prejudice of 
individuals in the absence of state assistance, encouragement or 
compulsion. 9s This is simply not the case. Governmental participa-
tion in and support of the system of segregation in the northern and 
western states was not a relic of the past at the time of the Brown 
decision. 99 Three notable examples of modern day governmental 
95. See note 75 supra. 
96. Gunnar Myrdal has identified the circular self-perpetuating nature of racial preju-
dice and discrimination as the principle of "cumulative causation." Once blacks are labeled 
as inferior, they are denied access to equal societal opportunities. The resulting inadequate 
educational preparation, poverty of cultural backgrounds, and lack of experience constitute 
real limitations on their ability to contribute to society and the prophecy of their inferiority 
is fulfilled. See G. MVRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 75-76 (1944). See also Lawrence, Negroes 
in Contemporary Society, in MAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 55-56 (C. Lawrence ed., Brooklyn 
College Press, 1962). 
97. Recent federal court decisions refusing to find "de facto discrimination" unconstitu-
tional are indicative of the courts' continuing refusal to acknowledge the self-perpetuating 
nature of the institution of segregation and other institutionalized discriminatory devices. 
Increasingly, courts are requiring well-proved evidence of specific discriminatory acts upon 
which to base relief. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 
(1977). 
98. While there is a grain of truth in the notion that all societal behavior stems from a 
conglomerate of individual attitudes, the manner in which government copes with the overt 
manifestations of popular prejudice determines whether or not it will b~ eliminated or mini-
mized. Likewise, governmental action may encourage private prejudice and insure its contin-
ued prosperity and institutionalization. 
99. In an article on residential segregation, Loren Miller attributes the chief cause of so-
called de facto segregation in northern schools to state action in one form or another: 
Residential segregation as we know it today is the end-product of more than a 
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segregation contemporaneous with Brown, which labeled blacks as 
inferior in the North as well as the South, were the continued segre-
gation of the United States Armed Forces until 1948,100 the Federal 
Housing Administration's active encouragement of segregated hous-
ing until 1950,101 and the statutory segregation by Congress of Wash-
ington D.C.'s school system until 1954}02 State and local officials 
have played an equally active, although not as well-documented, 
part in the maintenance of the system of segregation in the North. 
Highways and freeways were built as barriers between black and 
white communities,103 building officials did their utmost to hamper 
half-century of intensive governmental sanction and support of private segrega-
tory devices, and of the exercise of ingenuity on government's own part to 
achieve that same end. At one time or another in that more than fifty years, 
state legislatures, city councils, planning commissions, governors, state and 
federal courts, state and federal housing agencies, and United States Supreme 
Court, Congress and even Presidents lent willing hands to lay the firm founda-
tion for the gaudy superstructure of residential segregation that towers above 
today's American cities. 
Miller, Government's Responsibility for Residential Segregation, in RACE AND PROPERTY 60 
(J. Denton, ed. 1964). 
100. See J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 355-57 (Colum. U. Press 
1959). 
101. While restrictive covenants proliferated in an ad hoc manner apart from the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), they spread en masse under govenment compulsion because 
FHA refused to aid construction for racially mixed occupancy. As of 1948, FHA had not 
insured a single nonsegregated project. The FHA underwriting manual said, "If a neighbor-
hood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the 
same social and racial classes." FHA, UNDERWRITING MANUAL § 937 (1938), quoted in C. 
ABRAMS, supra note 70, at 230. The FHA drafted and urged adoption of racially restrictive 
covenants, and in numerous official pronouncements it advocated residential segregation. Its 
position was based upon the general, uncritically accepted assumption that the entry of 
blacks into white neighborhoods diminishes property values. For a detailed description of 
FHA's role as a propagator of housing segregation, see C. ABRAMS, supra note 70, at 229-43. 
See generally R. WEAVER, supra note 70; Comment, The Public Housing Administration and 
Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low-Rent Housing, 64 MICH. L. REv. 871 (1966). 
102. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In this companion case to Brown. the 
Supreme Court held that school segregation by the federal government in the District of 
Columbia violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 
The continued presence of de jure segregation within federal agencies well into the 
middle of the twentieth century raises an interesting question: do the policies and practices 
of the federal government in perpetuating a segregated system constitute state action in the 
context of school segregation at the state level when those policies have the effect of fostering 
segregation in the schools? Another question arises as to whether the fifth amendment du~ 
process clause protects only children in the District of Columbia from federally sanctioned 
segregation. If the injury results from the act of separation, then the issue is moot. But if black 
children are injured by the label placed upon them by the system of segregation, then federal 
segregation of housing and the armed forces is a constitutional violation of all black children's 
rights to due process. 
103. See Davis, The Effects of a Freeway Displacement on Racial Housing Segregation 
40 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12 
building intended for blacks in white neighborhoods,11I4 local police 
and fire departments excluded blacks by discriminatory hiring prac-
tices,lO:; and until 1948 local courts consistently enforced restrictive 
covenants. 108 
Once the state has effectively institutionalized racial segrega-
tion as a labeling device, only minimal maintenance is required to 
keep it in working order. Once the system is established, any at-
tempt to distinguish "active" governmental involvement in racial 
segregation from "passive" or "neutral" tolerance of private segre-
gation is illusory. Present passivity is merely a continuation of past 
action. The individual facing well-entrenched segregated housing 
patterns does not make a wholly "private" choice when deciding to 
move into a neighborhood with persons of a like race. That choice 
is substantially influenced by societal or institutional pressures to 
conform to the prevailing norm. Job security and opportunity for 
advancement, availability of financing, and one's family's personal 
comfort may all depend upon such conformity. These institution-
alized attitudes or norms are directly traceable to a time when the 
state was actively involved in their establishment. There has not 
been an intervening period in which these attitudes were not present 
so that it could truly be said they were private in origin. They 
remain because the state has never met the Green requirement of 
affirmative disestablishment. 
III. THE HEART OF THE PLESSY DOCTRINE IS 
ALIVE AND WELL 
While the Milliken case is used herein as a point of departure 
and reference, the Burger Court does not stand alone in history in 
its misunderstanding of segregation. There is ample precedent for 
in a Northern City, 26 PHYLON 209, 214 (1965); Roberts, Homes, Road Builders and the 
Courts: Highway Relocation and Judici~l Review of Administrative Action, 46 So. CAL. L.R. 
51,55 (1972); Sevilla, Asphalt Through the Model Cities: A Study of Highways and the Urban 
Poor, 49 J. URB. L. 297 (1971). 
104. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM 
HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 123-31 (1968); Note, Racial Discrimination in Public 
Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REv. 63 (1970). 
105. See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Servo Comm'n, 
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro V. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter V. 
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Chance V. Board of 
Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Western Addition Community Organ. v. Alioto, 360 
F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
106. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Miller, supra note 99, at 62. 
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the Court's failure to face up to the realities of "Jim Crow." Further-
more, it is evident that the Court's failure has been more intentional 
than not. 
The first l07 and most transparent example of the Supreme 
Court's choosing not to "call it like they must have seen it" is Plessy 
v. Ferguson,108 the source of the infamous doctrine of "separate but 
equal. " 109 In Plessy, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute requiring 
separate facilities for white and black passengers on trains as not 
violative of the fourteenth amendment prohibition of unequal pro-
tection of the laws. 
The Court said the object of the fourteenth amendment "was 
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before 
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended 
to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two 
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."I1° Without doubt, it was 
obvious to any adult living in the United States in 1896 that the 
"social" and "political" inequality of blacks were inextricably inter-
woven. 1II In any event, it is clear that the Justices who joined the 
Plessy majority must have understood the nature of segregation if 
only because their colleague, Justice Harlan, had explained it to 
them so clearly in his dissent: 
107. Although Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court directly confronted the question of whether segregation violated the equal 
protection clause of the 14th amendment, several earlier decisions suggested the segregation-
ist tendencies of the Court and a clear penchant for judicial inconsistency where necessitated 
by white supremacy. In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878), the Court held that a Louisiana 
statute requiring integrated facilities on passenger vessels was an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. Five years later, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
the Court held that the federal laws prohibiting segregation were also unconstitutional. 
Shortly thereafter, in apparent conflict with its nullification of the Louisiana integration law, 
the Court held in Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1889), 
that a Mississippi railroad segregation act did not constitute interference with interstate 
commerce. 
108. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
109. The doctrine of separate but equal apparently originated in Roberts v. City of 
Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1850), but it was first articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1896). 
110. 163 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added). 
111. In his "Atlanta Compromise" speech of 1895, Booker T. Washington told his white 
audience that "[i)n all things that are purely social we can be separate as the fingers, yet 
one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress." R. KLUGER, supra note 55, at 70. 
There is every indication that his analysis was more a reflection of what he knew whites 
wanted to hear than it was an expression of a genuine belief that the social and political status 
of blacks in the United States could be separated. 
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What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly 
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, 
than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground 
that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they can-
not be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white 
citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such 
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana. 1I2 
Whether the Plessy majority feigned blindness to the real and 
obvious meaning of segregation on railways because they themselves 
were committed to white superiority, 113 or because they realized that 
the nation's commitment to the same would have made enforce-
ment of a contrary decision impossible and therefore judicially un-
sound, is open to debate. There is, however, no questioning the fact 
that the Plessy Court's articulation of an incorrect understanding 
of the nature of segregation was the result of a conscious decision. 
The Supreme Court was somewhat more subtle but no less 
astute in avoiding any discussion of the real meaning of segregation 
in the graduate and professional school cases which paved the way 
for Brown. In Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada;114 Sipuel v. Board 
of Regents; 115 Sweatt v. Painter; 116 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education; 117 the Court, in considering the con-
stitutionality of segregated graduate study programs at public uni-
versities, found it unnecessary to re-examine the "separate but 
equal" doctrine in order to grant desegregation relief to the plain-
tiffs.lIs 
112. 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
113. Justice Henry Billings Brown, the author of the Plessy majority opinion, was a 
native of Massachusetts and a pre-war Republican, but had been unfriendly toward abolition. 
In his Plessy verdict, Justice Brown relied heavily upon the segregationists' reasoning of 
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850), authored by another son of the Bay 
State, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw. Thus, it was two northerners who established the rationale 
and legality of segregation, while Justice Harlan, a native southerner and former slave-holder, 
voiced the nation's most significant. objection. 
114. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
115. 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
116. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
117. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
118. The Court's failure could be attributed in part to the NAACP's litigation strategy. 
Blacks were aware that segregation had to be destroyed as a system before political equality 
could be achieved. Education, and more particularly graduate and law school education, was 
chosen as the initial target of attack for several strategic reasons including the fact that the 
absence of black graduate and law schools in many southern states meant that those states 
were subject to attack under the Plessy doctrine. But Charles Houston, Special Counsel for 
the NAACP between 1935 and 1940, and the chief architect of the pre-Brown strategy, made 
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In Sweatt, in finding that a segregated law school for blacks 
could not provide them equal educational opportunities, the Court 
relied on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment but which make for greatness in a law school." 119 In McLaurin 
the· Court required that a black admitted to a white graduate 
school not be segregated within the classroom and cafeteria and 
should be treated like all other students; again, the Court based its 
decision on the intangible considerations of "his ability to study, to 
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, 
in general, to learn his profession."12o In neither opinion was there 
mention of the obvious fact that in each case the state had relegated 
black students to a separate school or separate seats within the 
classroom for the specific purpose of designating them inferior,'21 
This article has already touched upon the Warren Court's fail-
ure in Brown v. Board of Education 122 to support the holding that 
"segregation is inherently unequal" with what was the obvious, sim-
plest, and most clearly unassailable rationale. 12:! Instead of taking 
judicial cognizance of the fact. that the manifest purpose of segrega-
tion was to designate blacks as inferior and noting that such a pur-
pose was constitutionally impermissible,124 the Court chose to focus 
upon the effect of school segregation. 
clear his understanding of both the source of the harm and of the ultimate goal. In a speech 
before the National Bar Association in 1935, he said that "Equality of education is not 
enough. There can be no equality under a segregated system. No segregation operates fairly 
on a minority group unless it is a d[olminant minority .... The American [Negro1 is not 
a dominant minority; therefore he must fight for complete elimination of segregation as his 
ultimate goal." Speech by Charles Houston, National Bar Ass'n Convention, "Proposed Legal 
Attacks on Educational Discrimination." (Aug. 1, 1935) (uncorrected typescript excerpted in 
McNeil, supra note 41, at 126. 
119. 339 U.S. at 634. 
120. 399 U.S. at 641. 
121. The Court has been reluctant to inquire into legislative motive because of the 
difficulty of determining the sole or dominant motivation behind the choices of a group of 
legislators. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 
87 (1810). Cases where the enactments resulted in different treatment for whites and blacks 
and where no other rationally related purpose has been set forth by the state, see, e.g., Griffin 
v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Gomillionv. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), have 
been distinguished by the Court, see, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 221-25 (1971), 
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
123. Virtually contemporaneous with the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the history of that amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873). The Court concluded that there was one prevailing purpose to the 
amendment: "we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of 
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions 
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." [d. at 71. 
124. See text accompanying notes 37-59 supra. 
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In Brown, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, began the crucial portion of his opinion by describing the 
importance of education in achieving political equality. He then 
proceeded to cite evidence presented to the Court by social scien-
tists indicating that the effect of school segregation on black chil-
dren was to generate "a feeling of inferiority" that in turn affects 
the motivation and ability of these children to learn.12:' In short, 
segregation violated the equal protection clause because of its em-
pirically demonstrated discriminatory effect on the 'educa-
tional/political opportunity afforded blacks. While the evidence and 
reasoning were sound, the Court's choice of rationale avoided any 
direct refutation of the Plessy dicta that the fourteenth amendment 
was not "intended to abolish distinctions based on color, or to en-
force social, as distinguished from political equality. "128 More im-
portantly, by focusing on effect the Court avoided any recognition 
of the fact that the purpose of the "social" inequalities of the system 
of segregation is the maintenance of "political" inequality. 
Again, there is every indication that the Brown Court's choice 
of a rationale that avoided any explicit mention of the true nature 
of segregation was not without design. The simplicity of holding 
segregation unconstitutional because of its impermissible purpose 
must have been apparent to the Court.127 Moreover, among the argu-
ments made by counsel for plaintiffs in brief and in oral argument 
was the argument that the express purpose of the fourteenth amend-
ment was to deprive the states of the authority to enforce existing 
"black codes"12H or in the future set up additional "black codes" and 
125. 347 U.S. at 494. 
126. 163 U.S. at 544. Note that while the Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), said that "[alny language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is 
rejected," 347 U.S. at 494-95, the Brown finding dealt only with segregated education and 
has never been read as reversing any part of Plessy. Although the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Brown dealt only with the inequality inherent in segregated schools, a subsequent series 
of per curiam decisions declaring the segregation of public facilities unconstitutional made it 
clear that the Brown holding extended to areas which the Plessy Court's definition would have 
considered social. See, e.g., State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (involving 
athletic contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) 
(involving public parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (involving public 
golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (involving public beaches!. 
By using per curiam decisions in these cases, the Court again avoided the opportunity to 
controvert the Plessy dicta distinguishing "social" from "political" equality. 
127. See Black, supra note 50, at 428. 
128. A great fear of black insurrection and revenge following the abolition of slavery 
resulted in the adoption of "black codes" by the provisional legislatures established by Presi-
dent Johnson in 1865. These codes were intended to establish a system of peonage or appren-
ticeship resembling slavery. See C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 23. 
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that segregation laws, like the black codes, were designed to estab-
lish a caste system. 129 The Brown plaintiffs also relied heavily, in 
both brief and oral argument, upon Strauder v. West Virginia, 1:10 a 
case which discussed the purposes of the fourteenth amendment at 
some length with the benefit of historical proximity to its adoption. 
Strauder, in holding the total exclusion of blacks from juries uncon-
stitutional, spoke of the fourteenth amendment as follows: 
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but 
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or 
right, most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption 
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as co-
lored,-exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferi-
ority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment 
of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are 
steps towards reduclng them to the condition of a subject race. 131 
In the period of over twenty years since Brown, the Supreme 
Court has considered numerous school desegregation cases without 
expanding upon or more fully articulating its rationale. In all of 
these cases Brown has been cited for its holding that continued 
school segregation was inherently incompatible with the equal pro-
tection clause without significant further comment upon or reconsi-
deration of why. 
IV. MILLIKEN RECONSIDERED 
Thus far three major points which provide an analytical frame-
work for reconsidering the Milliken case have been discussed. 
129. In Brown, Thurgood Marshall, attorney for the plaintiff, citing Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), and noting that the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy was 
inconsistent with Strauder, made the following point during oral argument: 
[Ylou cannot escape this point: that the Amendment was adopted for the 
express purpose of depriving the states of authority to exercise and enforce the 
existing Black Codes; that by putting it in the Constitution it was obviously 
intended that the states would not have the power in the future to set up 
additional Black Codes; and to use the language of this Court in one case, Lane 
l'. Wilson, [307 U.S. 268 (1939»), whether it is sophisticated or simple-minded; 
and the part that is to my mind crucial in this case, is that until this time the 
appellees have shown nothing that can in any form or fashion say that the 
statutes involved in these cases are not the same type of statutes discussed in 
the debates and in the decision of the Court nearest to that, namely the Black 
Codes, and I do not see how the inevitable result can be challenged, because they 
are of the exact same cloth, when you go to these Black Codes. 
1953 Oral Argument for Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in ARGUMENT, .~upra 
note 50, at 198. 
130. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
131. [d. at 307-08 (emphasis added). 
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First, the injury inflicted upon black children by segregation is 
one of pejorative classification. This injury occurs by virtue of the 
existence of the system or institution of segregation rather than 
particular segregating acts. 132 
Second, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment is violated by significant state involvement in the creation or 
maintenance of the socio-political system of segregation, and the 
constitutional rights of black children are violated whenever the 
state acts to perpetuate that system. 133 This is true without regard 
to whether the purpose or direct result of the act is the segregation 
of schools themselves, and such a constitutional violation may not 
be limited in scope by the boundaries of a school district or other 
subdivision of the state.13~ 
Third, the affirmative duty to disestablish segregation set forth 
in Green v. County School Board l33 must apply to all states who 
have played a predominant role in its establishment regardless of 
their geographic location or the date upon which statutes mandat-
ing segregation were removed from their books. 13B 
If the Milliken case is reconsidered in light of this analysis, it 
becomes apparent that affirmation of the district court opinion or-
dering an inter-district remedyl37 is compelled on several grounds. 
First, the state had recently participated in the segregation of De-
troit schools; the record contained clear uncontroverted evidence of 
state involvement in the segregation of Detroit schools. 13R This activ-
ity by the state labeled or classified as inferior not just Detroit black 
children but all black children upon whom the state could exert its 
power or from whom it could require obedience. Because the injury 
of the labeling of black children as inferior reached beyond the 
boundaries of the Detroit school district, the constitutional right to 
132. See text accompanying notes 34-63 supra. 
133. See text accompanying notes 64-75 supra. 
134. Because the publication of the defamation against black children has clearly ex-
tended beyond any particular school district's boundaries, the relief is inadequate if it is 
restricted by such boundaries. In order to mitigate damages, the retraction of a defamation 
must be coextensive with the publication of the defamation itself. See note 75 supra and 
accompanying text. 
135. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
136. See text accompanying notes 82-106 supra. 
137. 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
138. In the Milliken decision the Supreme Court made note of the findings of the district 
court and the court of appeals in this regard: "The record before us, voluminous as it is, 
contains evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools .... " 418 U.S. 
at 745. 
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be free of that injury also extended beyond the district. By redefin-
ing the nature of the constitutional infringement, the remedy must 
be likewise altered. According to the Milliken majority's own rea-
soning, "the scope of the remedy is determind by the nature and 
extent of the constitutional violation."139 Thus, an inter-district 
remedy was clearly appropriate. 
Second, in all likelihood the state had participated in the main-
tenance of segregated housing in the suburbs.l~o Although Justice 
Stewart, concurring, found no evidence on the record of racially 
discriminatory use of housing or zoning laws, 141 it is unlikely that the 
ubiquitous presence of exclusively white housing in the Detroit sub-
urbs had occurred entirely without state participation or accommo-
dation. u2 Such discrimination did as much to classify black children 
as inferior as sending them to separate schools; it constituted an-
other constitutional violation which was multi-district in scope and 
therefore properly subject to an inter-district remedy. 
Third, the state had never disestablished the segregated school 
system which it played a significant role in creating. While the 
Milliken majority indicated that there was no evidence hinting that 
outlying school districts had historically maintained other then uni-
tary school systems, U3 a more careful review of the history of the 
139. [d. at 744, citing Swann v. Charlotte·Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971). . . 
140. See notes 99 and 104 supra. 
141. 418 U.S. 753-55 (Stewart, J., concurring). The fact that there was no such evidence 
in all likelihood stems from the fact that the litigation was initially based on a theory that 
required evidence of de jure segregated conditions in Detroit schools only. That was the theory 
upon which the district court took evidence at trial. [d. at 745. 
142. Justice Douglas discussed the "expanded de jure" argument in Gomperts v. Chase, 
404 U.S. 1237 (1971), when the Court denied a stay of the lower court order pending appeal. 
[d., denying injunct. pending appeal, 329 F. Supp. 1192 (N .0. Cal. 1971). After admitting 
that "the precise contours of de jure segregation have not been drawn by the Court," 404 U.S. 
at 1238, Justice Douglas outlined the following sources, alleged by plaintiffs to be the govern-
mental agencies responsible for racial imbalance: 
(1) California's Bayshore Freeway effectively isolated Blacks and resulted 
in a separate and predominantly black high school. 
(2) State planning groups fashioned and built the black community 
around that school. 
(3) Realtors-licensed by the States-have kept "white property" white 
and "black property" black. 
(4) Banks chartered by the State shaped the policies that handicapped 
blacks in financing homes other than in black ghettoes. 
(5) Residential segregation, fostered by state enforced restrictive cove-
nants, resulted in segregated schools. 
404 U.S. at 1239. 
See also Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (discussed in note 71 supra). 
143. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
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Michigan legislature reveals that in 1845 the legislature approved 
the incorporation of a school for Negroes only after the adoption of 
an amendment expressly prohibiting the admission of whites. IH It 
might well be argued that an 1867 Michigan act requiring that 
school districts provide education without discrimination as to race, 
and a 1963 amendment to the Michigan Constitution providing for 
non-discriminatory educational opportunity have operated to repeal 
the previous discriminatory laws. 14j But mere repeal of segregation 
statutes and the passage of time is not sufficient to satisfy the com-
mand of Green. In the face of evidence of a still well-entrenched 
dual system, Michigan had clearly not met the burden of coming 
forward with a plan in which racial discrimination was eliminated 
"root and branch," a plan that "promised realistically to work 
now."UR 
V. THE FRUIT OF MILLIKEN: THE COURT 
CURTAILS INTRA-DISTRICT RELIEF 
In three recent Supreme Court decisions the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its refusal to recognize the true nature of the injury in-
flicted by the institution of segregation. In vacating federal district 
and circuit court desegregation orders in Pasadena City Board of 
Education v. Spangler, 147 Austin Independent School District v. 
United States, UR and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, U9 
the Court followed the pattern set in Milliken and purported to 
question only the scope of the remedy ordered by the lower courts. 
A closer look at the three opinions, however, reveals that the reme-
dies ordered are inappropriate only because the Supreme Court has 
once again ignored the rather obvious truths about segregation set 
forth above. 
144. L.F. LITWACK, supra note 91, at 122·23, citing THE LIBERATOR (Apr. 4, 1845). 
145. See People ex rei. Workman v. Board of Educ., 18 Mich. 400 (1869) (citing Act 34, 
§ 28 of 1867 Mich. Pub. Acts). 
The Michigan Constitution provides, in part, that "[eJvery school district shall provide 
for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or 
national origin." MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2. The Michigan laws provide, in part, that "[nJo 
separate school or department shall be kept for any person or persons on account of race or 
color." MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 340.355 (1976), and that "[aJll persons, residents of a 
school district ... shall have an equal right to attend school therein." [d. § 340.356. See 
also Act :318, pt. II, chs. 2, 9, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1927. 
146. See notes 86 and 87 supra and accompanying text. 
147. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
148. 429 U.S. 990 (1976). 
149. 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
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In Pasadena, 1,,0 the Supreme Court found the district court in 
error when, in 1974, it refused to modify its 1970 desegregation order 
to eliminate the requirement that there be "no school in the 
[district] with a majority of any minority students."ul The Court 
noted that the defendant board had been in literal compliance with 
this provision of the order in the initial year of its operation; 
while some five schools were ostensibly in violation of the district 
court's "no majority of any minority" requirement at the time ofthe 
hearing on the motion to modify, there was no showing that the 
post-1971 changes in racial mix of those schools were caused by 
segregative acts chargeable to defendants. The Court found that 
compliance with the pupil assignment requirement in 1970 
"established a racially neutral system" in the school district and 
that "[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitu-
tionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial 
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegre-
gate has been accomplished and racial discrimination through offi-
cial action is eliminated from the system."(:12 . 
But, had the school board met its affirmative duty to eliminate 
state created discrimination from the system? Had it established a 
racially neutral system? The answer is clearly "no." In its original 
order, the district court had found the existence of a segregated or 
dual system by virtue of the district's policies with regard to the 
hiring, promotion and assignment of teachers and professional staff 
members; the construction and location of faCilities; and the assign-
ment of students. 153 All of the practices served separately and cumu-
latively to stigmatize blacks and the schools they attended and at 
which they taught. 
The Supreme Court refused to understand, however, that once 
the stigma is affixed by the existence of a dual school system, the 
injury remains, at the very least, until the state has ceased all offi-
cial name calling, that is, by way of hiring and promotion of teach-
ers and construction and location of schools as well as by student 
assignment. The Court perceived the assignment of students as a 
distinct and separable constitutional violation which could be inde-
pendently corrected, and held that once the school board had met 
150. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
151. [d. at 431. 
152. [d. at 436. quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ .• 402 U.S. 1. 31-
32 (1971). 
153. 311 F. Supp. 501. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
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this requirement of the order it could not be held responsible for any 
further violation. The Court ignored the probability that much of 
the "white flight" which had caused the "desegregation" between 
1971 and 1974 had occurred because the schools involved continued 
to be identified as "black" schools and because the school district 
by its teacher assignment practices continued to label blacks as 
inferior and unfit to go to school with. 
In Austin Independent School District v. United States, I:'~ the 
Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion vacating a Fifth Circuit 
desegregation order requiring extensive busing within the school 
district. In a concurring opinion which echoed the Milliken holding 
that the remedy must be co-extensive with the proven wrong, Jus-
tice Powell noted that "large-scale busing is permisible only where 
the evidence supports a finding that the extent of the integration 
sought to be achieved by busing would have existed had the school 
authorities fulfilled their constitutional obligations in the past."I:':' 
While Milliken is cited in Austin for the proposition that the 
remedy should not exceed the scope of the violation,I:'6 Justice Pow-
ell has gone even further in curtailing plaintiffs' chances for gaining 
relief, establishing a presumption of innocence in favor of the defen-
dant school district. This shifting of the burden of proof is unprece-
dented; plaintiffs must now prove that each instance of segregation 
within a district would not have occurred but for the intentional acts 
of the school board. This represents a radical retreat from Keyes v. 
School District No. 1157 which established the rule that once plain-
tiffs establish intent to segregate which affects a substantial portion 
of the school district, it will be presumed that all remaining segrega-
tion in the district resulted from intentional state action. The Su-
preme Court has once again ignored the fact that when the school 
board intentionally segregates one school, it has not only stigma-
tized the black children in that school but it has done so to all of 
the black children in the district. 
154. 429 U.S. 990 (1976), 
155. [d. at 995 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). 
156. [d. at 991. 
157. 413 U.S. 189 (1973), In Keyes, the Court held that once plaintiffs had produced 
evidence establishing intentional segregatory actions affecting a substantial portion of the 
district, the presence of a dual system would be presumed and the burden would shift to the 
defendants to rebut that presumption by showing: (1) "that segregative intent was not among 
the factors that motivated [government) actions"; or (2) that government actions "were not 
a factor in creating a natural environment for the growth of further segregation." [d. at 210-
11. 
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Likewise, in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,I!iX the 
Supreme Court vacated a federal district court order which required 
that all schools be brought within fifteen percent of Dayton's forty-
eight to fifty-two percent black-white populatiop ratio. I !i9 The Su-
preme Court found that a constitutional violation affecting only 
high schools, whereby optional attendance zones could be used to 
allow white students to avoid attending predominantly black 
schools, would not justify an order requiring that all schools be 
integrated. 
Relying on Austin, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
reiterated Justice Powell's new twist on the Milliken rule that the 
scope of the remedy not exceed the scope of the violation yo In 
particular, he found that the district court "must determine how 
much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the 
racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently con-
stituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have 
been in the absence of such constitutional violations. "I~I 
But the Court has done more than simply apply the Milliken 
test. Insult has been added to injury in citing Keyes u. School Dis-
trict No.1 as precedent l62 for this novel placement of the evidentiary 
burden. The rule established in Keyes would clearly have required 
that, a prima facie case of intentional segregation having been 
made, the burden would shift to the school district to prove that 
existing segregation in the district was not the result of its acts. The 
Dayton Court, thus, misinterpreted Keyes when it placed the full 
burden of proving constitutional violation or injury on the plaintiffs 
without applying the Keyes presumption. 
Only by ignoring the nature of the institution of segregation can 
the Supreme Court hold that a school board may declare black high 
school students unfit to go to school with white students and fail to 
recognize that black elementary school children in the same school 
district are equally injured by that declaration. When black high 
school students are labeled inferior by segregation, their younger 
brothers and sisters in elementary school do not escape that label. 
Thus, the constitutional violation pervades the entire school sys-
tem, if not the entire community of Dayton. 
158. 97 S. Ct. 2766 (1977). 
159. [d. at 2769. 
160. [d. at 2775. 
161. [d. 
162. [d. 
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In the Pasadena, Austin and Dayton decisions the Court has 
reaped the "strange fruit" of Milliken. While professing to be con-
cerned only with the inequities of lower court remedies, the Court 
has used its "misunderstanding" of the institution of segregation to 
ignore both intra- and inter-district violations of the rights of black 
children. 
Recently there have been serious questions raised concerning 
the necessity and propriety of insisting on full and complete integra-
tion of schools or racial balance in pupil assignmment as a remedy 
to the constitutional injury of segregated schools.163 The reluctance 
of civil rights attorneys to re-examine the dogma that in every situa-
tion equal educational opportunity must mean integrated schools is 
somewhat disturbing. It is suggested, however, that a proper under-
standing of the injury inflicted by segregation provides plaintiffs as 
well as the Court with more flexibility in devising the remedy which 
need not be limited to the remedy of complete racial integration or 
no remedy at all.164 
What must be clear is that blacks are entitled to a removal of 
the defamatory label. If plaintiffs decide that such remedy is best 
achieved by community control of schools rather than busing then 
that remedy is adequate. The recognition and judicial acknowledg-
ment of the constitutional violation is important quite apart from 
the question of appropriate relief. While black parents mayor may 
not view forced busing as a desirable solution, the judicial declara-
163. See Bell, Seruing Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341 (1975). 
164. In at least two cases, district courts have approved plans that give black parents a 
larger measure of control over school policy-making and monetary resources in exchange for 
less integration than would otherwise have been ordered. In an Atlanta, Georgia case, the 
settlement plan caJled for the plaintiffs to give up their right to fuJI desegregation of metropol-
itan Atlanta in return for a number of administrative positions including a black superintend-
ent of schools. See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N .D. Ga.), aff'd, 487 F .2d 680 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
In a Fort Worth, Texas case, the court approved a similar settlement allowing for the 
continuance of a predominantly black high school and middle school on a finding that black 
parents wanted to maintain a community school. See Flax v. Potts, No. 4205, at 21 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 23, 1973). • 
In Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977) (Milliken m. the Supreme Court upheld a 
district court order r~quiring that the Detroit Board of Education and the State of Michigan 
bear the costs of remedial or compensatory education programs including in-service training 
for teachers and administrators; guidance and counseling programs; and revised testing pro-
cedures. Id. at 2751. The Court rejected defendant's argument that, since the constitutional 
violation was unlawful segregation, the Court's decree must be limited to redressing that 
violation by pupil assignments. Id. at 2758. 
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tion of a wrong requiring redress surely gives the black community 
an additional asset in their negotiations with the powers that be. 165 
The Milliken majority's extensive discussion of the potential 
problems of inter-district relief would suggest that the Court's reluc-
tance to recognize the full scope of the injury stems, in significant 
part, from its dissatisfaction with the proposed remedy. The Court 
has always balanced competing individual and societal interests 
when it determines the scope of relief. 166 But in Milliken the Court 
did much more than decide that the means chosen by the district 
court to redress the injury of segregation were not "reasonably avail-
able" or "feasible". The Supreme Court did not justify its reversal 
of the lower court simply because the proposed remedy would un-
dermine "local control of schools"; 167 it did so by denying the exist-
ence of any injury or constitutional violation outside of Detroit. 16H 
The Milliken decision not only denied black children and their 
parents in Detroit the relief of inter-district busing, it denied them 
a judicial declaration which accurately described the full extent of 
their injury and thereby the political leverage which might have 
aided them in gaining more control of resources. Where the injury 
involved is one of defamation or stigmatization, there is an import-
ance in official recognition and acknowledgment of that injury over 
and above the specific relief which attaches thereto. The individual 
whose reputation is injured by a false statement is to some extent 
made whole by the judicial finding and declaration of his having 
been wronged. This is especially important in the area of racial 
discrimination, for only when this country can bring itself to ac-
knowledge the full extent of past and present racism will it accept 
the full moral responsibility of eliminating it. 169 
In 1974, civil rights advocates recognized that the Supreme 
Court's refusal to involve white suburbs in remedying northern 
school segregation marked a judicial retreat in the face of strong 
public opposition to forced bussing. 
In retrospect, Milliken has proved to be even more disturbing 
m its implications. In Pasadena, Austin and Dayton, the Court, 
165. See Mays, Comment: Atlanta-Living With Brown Twenty Years' Later, 3 BLACK 
L.J. 184 (1974). 
166. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte· 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
167. 418 U.S. at 741-44. 
168. [d. at 745. 
169. See notes 75 and 134 supra. 
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relying on Milliken, has not only refused to recognize the true nature 
and scope of the injury inflicted by segregation, but it has made 
apparent its disinclination to take cognizance of that truth by im-
posing upon plaintiffs the burden of proving particular constitu-
tional violations where such violations clearly already exist. 
Conclusion 
In 1857, the Supreme Court, in the infamous Dred Scott case, 171 
placed its own imprimatur upon the governmental defamation of 
blacks in this country. While Chief Justice Taney's opinion is uni-
versally looked upon as a dark spot in the Court's history, it is 
extremely instructive in that it is also the Court's most candid and 
accurate explication of the social/political status of black people in 
the United States. 172 
Justice Taney's opinion is especially enlightening in the context 
of the present discussion because it demonstrates in no uncertain 
terms th~ Court's recognition of the fact that the "social" status and 
the "political" status of blacks in the several states were reflective 
of one another if not identical. The question before the Court was 
whether blacks, or the descendants of former slaves, were intended 
to be included within the meaning of the word "citizens" in the 
Constitution.173 The Court's answer was that they were not, and to 
support that conclusion, Justice Taney turned to an exhaustive 
cataloguing of the inferior "social" position of blacks: 
They had for more than a century before been regarded as 
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far 
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound 
to respect. . . . This opinion was at the time fixed and univer-
sal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as 
an axiom in morals as well as in politics, which no one thought 
of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in 
every grade and position in society daily and habitually acted 
170. See generally Amaker, Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Con.~titution in 
School Desegregation Cases, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 349, 349-50 (1975). 
171. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
172. Fredrick Douglass described Justice Taney's description of the position of blacks 
in the United States as "historical fact." F. DOUGLAss, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDRICK DOUGLASS 
293 (1962). 
173. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403. 
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upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public 
concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this 
opinion. 174 
55 
For Justice Taney, the indivisibility of the social and political 
status of blacks was so plain that he could use evidence of the former 
to prove the latter. Forty years later the Plessy Court denied the 
existence of that identity in holding that segregation had no politi-
cal purpose or effect and was therefore no concern of the fourteenth 
amendment. Subsequently the Supreme Court has avoided the true 
meaning of that identity by finding segregation violative of the 
equal protection clause without directly refuting Plessy's separate 
but equal doctrine. 
Justice Taney was prepared to recognize the intimate inter-
relationship between the social and political status of blacks be-
cause it served his purpose of proving that blacks were entirely 
without political status. But his analytical premise continues to be 
correct: that the intention of excluding blacks from the political 
process can be demonstrated by evidence of laws connoting social 
subservience. This is so because the clear and irrefutable purpose 
and effect of such laws is to secure the political subservience of 
blacks. Thus, until the Supreme Court understands and articulates 
this simple relationship, I it will continue to misunderstand the na-
ture of the injury which segregation inflicts upon blacks and the true 
basis of its inherent violation of the equal protection clause. 
Because each of the Court's school desegregation decisions has 
resulted in the elimination of some manifestation of segregation, it 
may seem of little more than academic interest that the Court has 
made the right decisions for the wrong reasons. But in truth the 
matter has more far-reaching implications-for it is the failure of 
the Court to accurately identify the source of the injury inherent in 
segregated schools that has resulted in its erroneous distinction be-
tween de facto and de jure segregation as expressed in Keyes u. 
School District No. 1175 and in the disastrous restrictions placed on 
the scope of relief in Milliken and its progeny. 
It is incumbent upon those concerned with racial justice in this 
country to continue to confront the Court with an honest and un-
compromising analysis of the institution of segregation as we press 
our causes before the bar. Until the Court is forced to recognize and 
i74. [d. at 407 (emphasis added). 
175. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). 
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identify the true nature of the malignancy, the disease will prosper. 
Unfortunately, if history is at all indicative of what the future holds, 
segregation will continue to be "misunderstood" by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, despite our best efforts, until the na-
tion's commitment to equality for blacks is as clear as was its com-
mitment to white supremacy in 1857. 
